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Abstract—Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) is an informa-
tion centric security solution that moves beyond traditional
restrictions of point-to-point encryption by allowing for flexible,
fine-grain policy-based and content-based access control that is
cryptographically enforced. As the original ABE systems are
managed by a single authority, several efforts have decentralized
different ABE schemes to address the key escrow problem, where
the authority can issue secret keys to itself to decrypt all the
ciphertext. However, decentralized ABE (DABE) schemes raise
the issue of collusion attacks. In this paper, we review two existing
types of collusion attacks on DABE systems, and introduce a
new type of collusion among authorities and data users. We
show that six existing DABE systems are vulnerable to the newly
introduced collusion and propose a model to secure one of the
DABE schemes.
Index Terms—Attribute Based Encryption, CP-ABE, Decen-
tralization, Collusion
I. INTRODUCTION
For Alice to communicate securely with Bob via public-
key encryption, she encrypts a message with Bob’s public
key, which Bob decrypts with his private key. Here Alice
knows that it is Bob who she would like to communicate with.
However, there are situations where a data sender (data owner
or DO) would like to share data securely with (multiple) data
receivers (data users or DU) whose identities are not known at
the time of sharing. Although their identities are not known to
the sender ahead of time, the intended receivers or interested
users could be characterized by certain attributes. For instance,
in the context of medical research, a patient may want to
share his/her medical information with receivers who possess
attributes such as [“Doctor” or (“Researcher” & “Pathology
Department”)]. As the patient may not have the identities of
all the eligible data users, the conventional two-party public-
key encryption schemes cannot be applied.
In 2005, Sahai and Waters [1] introduced the concept of
Attribute-Based Encryption, which allows the mentioned pa-
tient to share his/her medical information with all the eligible
data users without knowing their explicit identities. There are
two kinds of ABE systems: Ciphertext Policy Attribute-based
Encryption (CP-ABE) [2] and Key Policy Attribute-based
Encryption (KP-ABE) [3]. In CP-ABE, each data user receives
one secret key for each of his/her attributes from the Authority.
The sender encrypts the data with an access policy specifying
the desired attributes of the intended receivers. Following the
previous example, the patient determines that only data users
who are either doctors or pathology researchers could decrypt
the ciphertext. In contrast, in KP-ABE , a data user receives
one secret key which encodes the predefined access policy
to decrypt the ciphertext. As CP-ABE is more practical for
real world applications, almost all research efforts work on
improving CP-ABE. For instance, a more efficient CP-ABE
scheme [4], privacy-preserving for the data users [5]–[7], faster
decryption [8], constant-sized ciphertexts [9]–[11], revocable
data users or attributes [12], [13], and so on.
The earlier CP-ABE systems are centralized as there is only
one authority. The authority decides the system parameters,
chooses the master key (MK), and issues Secret Keys (SK) as-
sociated with attributes to DU. Such a centralised architecture
raises several security issues, such as the single point of failure
and the key escrow problem where the authority, by using
MK, can generate SK for all the attributes for itself to decrypt
ciphertexts. To address these defects, many efforts [14] have
tried to decentralize earlier CP-ABE schemes by “dividing”
MK among different authorities, requesting a threshold t out
of n authorities to cooperate to issue SK, and demanding that
none of the authorities can issue SK for itself alone. However,
decentralization raises new kinds of collusion attacks.
This paper makes the following contributions. We first
review two existing types of collusion attacks on DABE,
collusion among authorities and collusion among DUs. We
then introduce a new kind of collusion where some authorities
collude with DUs, so that the colluding authorities can recover
the MKs of the other non-colluding authorities. After that,
the colluding authorities can take over the entire DABE
system and issue new SKs without needing any cooperation or
permission from other non-colluding authorities. Furthermore,
we show that six of the previously published DABE systems
are vulnerable to this new attack. Finally we introduce a
model to secure one of the defected systems from the newly
introduced of collusion attack.
The paper proceeds in Section II to review background
knowledge. Section III first discusses two existing collusion
models on DABE schemes and then introduces a new collusion
model among authorities and DUs. In Section IV, we analyze
four existing DABE models to show that they are all vulnera-
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ble to the newly introduced collusion attack. In Section V, we
propose a new model to secure one of the vulnerable models.
Section VI concludes the paper with future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review background knowledge needed for
the establishment of ABE and DABE systems and the analyses
of their security.
A. Bilinear Maps
Consider G0 and G1 as two multiplicative cyclic groups.
Suppose that the prime order of both groups is p and the
generator of G0 is g. There exists a map e: G0 ×G0 → G1,
with an efficient algorithm, which, for all g1, g2 ∈ G0,
computes e(g1, g2). Map e is termed bilinear if it has the
following two properties:
1) Bilinearity: For all g1, g2 ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp, there is
equation e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
B. CP-ABE
A CP-ABE scheme consists of the following four algo-
rithms.
Setup: The authority runs the setup algorithm to select the
Public Parameters (PP) of the system, choose the Master Key
(MK) for itself, and broadcast the Public Key (PK) to the
users.
Encryption: A DO specifies an access policy to determine
the needed attributes of DUs for decrypting the ciphertext. The
DO then uses PK to encrypt messages specifying the access
policy as part of the encryption, and broadcasts the ciphertext.
Key Generation: The authority runs the key generation
algorithm which uses MK to issue Secret Keys (SK) to DUs
based on the list of attributes of each DU.
Decryption: A DU uses its SK and PK to decrypt the
ciphertext. If a DU possesses enough attributes which are
specified in the access policy, the DU can recover the message.
If not, the decryption algorithm outputs an error to the DU.
C. Decentralized ABE
The original ABE models are administrated by a central
authority. Such a centralized architecture raises issues such as
key escrow [15], key exposure [16], ineligible DUs [17], pri-
vacy of DUs [18], forging signatures [19], and scalability [20].
To address these issues, several effort [14], [20]–[23] have
been proposed to decentralize ABE so that the responsibilities
of a central authority are divided among multiple authorities.
III. COLLUSION ATTACKS ON DABE
Although decentralization addresses several issues related
to centralized ABE, it raises new issues. In this section, we
review two existing collusion attacks on DABE: collusion
among different DUs and collusion among authorities, and
introduce a new collusion attack model among both authorities
and DUs.
1) Collusion among DUs: This type of collusion happens
when some data users with different SKs, collude with each
other and combine their SKs to decrypt a ciphertext which is
not accessible for each of them alone but is accessible for the
sum of the SKs [2]. For instance, suppose that DUA has two
attributes {Att1, Att3} and DUB has one attribute {Att2}.
Then, a DO encrypts a massage and determines the access pol-
icy as {Att1&Att2}. None of the two DUs has the needed SKs
to decrypt the ciphertext individually. Therefore, they might
want to collude each other by sharing their SKs to decrypt the
ciphertext with a set of SKs = {SKAtt1 , SKAtt2 , SKAtt3}.
Most of the excising ABE and DABE schemes adopt a
similar idea to secure systems against collusion among DUs.
Authority/authorities should choose different GIDs when run-
ning the Key Generating algorithm to issue the SKs. Different
SKs with different GIDs could not be combined to decrypt
ciphertext. To the best of our knowledge, all the existing ABE
and DABE schemes are secure against this kind of collusion
attacks.
2) Collusion among authorities. To address the key es-
crow problem, several efforts [24]–[27] had proposed different
DABE architectures, in which none of the authorities is able
to issue SKs by itself, as long as authorities do not collude
each other. However, these efforts had assumed explicitly that
authorities behave honestly so that they do not collude with
each other nor share their MKs with each other. Since there
is no easy way to monitor the authorities for collusion, this
is not a acceptable assumption. To the best of our knowledge,
there is not a DABE system which could prevent authorities
from colluding. Therefore, the key escrow problem remains
an open issue.
3) Collusion among authorities and DUs. In a DABE
system, each authority has its own MK and is responsible
for protecting it from leaking to other authorities. In addition,
there should be no chance for other authorities to circumvent
the security of an authority to uncover its MK. However, one
potential vulnerability is the collusion between other authori-
ties and DUs and the colluding authorities might uncover the
MKs of non-colluding authorities. This paper analyzes the
limitations of some of the existing DABE schemes to show
their vulnerability to this kind of collusion attack.
IV. ANALYSIS OF VULNERABLE SCHEMES
In this section, we analyze four existing DABE models to
show that they are vulnerable to the newly introduced collusion
attack among authorities and DUs. We show how some of the
authorities can collude with one DU to uncover the MK of the
other authority. We then describe a solution to secure one of
the vulnerable schemes.
Notice that the paper has been using “multiple authorities”
to represent DABE generically. However, each specific DABE
scheme has its unique way of “decentralizing” ABE so that
the multiple “authorities” are not simply replicas, but with
different delegated and/or partially replicated functions. In
addition, these “authorities” are also named differently in
different schemes. The following analysis of this paper adopts
the specific terminologies used in each scheme.
A. The Hur Model I
Hur et al. [21] investigated the key escrow problem by
decentralizing the Bethencourt model.
1) Review of the Hur model I: Hur et al. developed a DABE
model with two authorities: Key Generation Center (KGC) and
Attribute Authority (AA). The model works as follows.
Setup: First, a trust initializer (TI) decides the public param-
eters: a bilinear group G0 with prime order p and generator g
and a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G0, and broadcasts public
key PKTI = {G0, g,H}. Then, KGC chooses a random
exponent α ∈R1 Z∗p , saves its master key MKKGC = gα, and
broadcasts its public key PKKGC = e(g, g)α. AA selects a
random exponent β ∈R Z∗p , saves its master key MKAA = β,
and broadcast its public key PKAA = {gβ , g1/β}.
Fig. 1. Key generation round in the Hur model I
Key Generation: As depicted in Fig. 1, (1) a DU commu-
nicates with the AA to request SKs, based on the attributes
which it possesses. (2) AA chooses a specific random exponent
r∗p for the DU which should be unique for each DU to prevent
DUs from colluding with each other. Afterward, AA runs a
secure two-party computation protocol [28]–[30] to cooperate
with KGC to issue the personalized component (D) of the SK
without leaking their MKs to each other. The secure two-party
computation protocol outputs x = (α+r)β to KGC. (3) KGC
chooses a random exponent t ∈R Z∗p and sends A = gx/t to
AA. (4) KGC shares the choosen t with DU. (5) AA selects
random exponent rj ∈R Z∗p for each j ∈ S (the set of DU’s
attributes), and sends D′, a list of Dj and D′j to DU. Finally,
DU calculates D = (D′)t so that the computed SK would be
the same as the one in the Bethencourt model [2].
The Hur model I does not change the formulas used in
the Setup and Key Generation algorithms. Instead, the Hur
model I divides the responsibilities of the single authority in
the Bethencourt model between two authorities KGC and AA.
As SK, MK and PK are the same as in [2], the encryption and
decryption algorithms remain the same.
2) Vulnerability Analysis: The Hur model I is secure
against collusion among different DUs, because AA considers
a unique r (as GID) for each DU. However, given that the Hur
model I provided no explicit mechanism to prevent collusion
between AA and KGC, it is vulnerable to such an attack.
Furthermore, the following analysis demonstrates that the
Hur model I is not secure against collusion between DU and
AA. Suppose that AA colludes with a DU and receives t from
the DU, while it has A = gx/t. AA can calculate (gx/t)t =
gx. In addition, AA has β, and hence can find 1/β and then
(gx)1/β = gα+r. Finally, AA divides gα+r by gr to get gα.
1x ∈R S denotes choosing x randomly from a finite set S.
AA cannot find α from gα because solving such a logarithm
problem is not easy.
However, AA does not need α as gα is enough to generate
the component parts of SK which are generated by KGC.
Therefore, AA can generate SKs for itself or for any other
new DU without any permission and cooperation with KGC.
For instance, suppose AA decides r∗ for a new DU or for
itself. Then it calculates gα ·gr∗ = gα+r∗ . It finds (gα+r∗)1/β
which is the D part of the secret key for the new DU
that is supposed to be generated through a secure two-party
computation protocol with the cooperation of both KGC and
AA. Therefore, AA generated SK without any permission from
KGC.
A similar collusion cannot happen between KGC and a DU.
Even if KGC colludes with a DU to receive D′, Dj and D′j ,
KGC cannot uncover β and r from them. Although KGC
cannot launch effective collusion with any DU, it should worry
about collusion between AA and a DU. As there is no way for
KGC to prevent AA from such a collusion, KGC is obligated
to trust AA.
B. The Hur Model II
Hur et al. [22] extended their earlier work [21] to scale the
number of authorities.
1) Review of the Hur model II: This model decentralized
the Bethencourt model [2] by using a central authority (CA)
and a set of attribute authorities A1, A2, · · · , Am. This model
works as follows.
Setup: First, a trusted initializer chooses a bilinear group
G0 of prime order p and generator g. In addition, it selects
hash functions H . Then it broadcasts the public parameter
PP = {G0, g,H}. Then, CA chooses a random exponent
β ∈R Z∗R as its MK and publishes its public key PKCA =
{gβ}. Similarly, each Ai selects a random exponent αi ∈R Z∗R
as its MK and broadcasts its public key PKAi = e(g, g)
αi .
Key Generation: As depicted in Fig. 2, (1) DU requests
SK from CA. (2) CA chooses random exponents γi ∈R Z∗p
for each Ai such that
∑m
i=1 γi = rt. Then CA runs a secure
two-party computation protocol via cooperation with each Ai
which outputs x = (αi+γi)β to Ai. (3) Ai randomly chooses
exponent τ ∈R Z∗p , computes T = gx/τ , and sends it to CA.
(4) CA computes B = T 1/β
2
and then sends it to Ai. (5)
Ai computes Di = Bτ = g(αi+γi)/β and sends it to DU. The
protocol depicted in Fig. 2 should be ran between CA and each
Ai. At the end, DU receives all Di from all the authorities
and computes the D part of its SK via D =
∏m
i=1Di =
g(α1+···+αm+rt)/β . (6) To generate the other parts of SK, CA
chooses a random exponent r′ ∈R Z∗P and sends gr
′
to DU.
(7) CA sends grt−r
′
to Ai. (8) Ai selects rj ∈R Z∗P and issues
different parts of SK to DU (for each attribute λj related to
the set of attributes of DU which is decided by Ai) as follow.
∀λj ∈ S : Dj = grt−r′ ·H(λj)rj , D′j = grj
DU computes gr
′ ·Dj to find its total SK which is the same
as the Bethencourt model.
Fig. 2. Key generation round in the Hur model II
2) Vulnerability Analysis: Assume that CA colludes with
one DU and receives the D part of SK from DU. Since CA
knows β and rt, it can compute gα = Dβ/grt which is enough
to issue SK to a new DU without needing to cooperate with
any other authorities.
C. The Wang Model
Wang et al. [31] proposed a model which diminishes the
key escrow problem based on the Waters model [4].
1) Review of the Wang model: Two entities termed Key Au-
thority (KA) and Cloud Service Provider (CSP) cooperatively
issue SKs for DUs through a secure two-party key generation
protocol. The model works as follows.
Setup: The Wang model denotes G0 as a bilinear group of
prime order p and generator g, and choosew bilinear map eˆ :
G0 ×G0 → GT . It also chooses hash function H : (0, 1)∗ →
G0 and a set of weights W = {w1, w2, · · · , wn} for the set
of attributes A = {a1, a2, · · · , an}.
Afterwards, KA chooses random exponents α1, β ∈ Zp,
saves its master key MKKA = {α1, β} and broadcasts its
public key PKKA = {G0, g, gβ , eˆ(g, g)α1}. Similarly, CSP
chooses α2 ∈ Zp, saves its master key MKCSP = α2 and
broadcasts it public key PKCSP = eˆ(g, g)α2 .
Fig. 3. Key generation round in the Wang model
Key Generation: As depicted in Fig. 3, (1) a DU requests
SKs for its attributes. (2) KA chooses a unique r ∈ Zp. Then
KA and CSP cooperatively run a secure two-party computation
protocol which outputs x = (α1 + α2)β to CSP. (3) CSP
chooses a random exponent ρ1 ∈ Zp and sends X1 = gx/ρ1
to KA. (4) KA chooses a random exponent θ ∈ Zp and sends
Y1 = X
θ/β
1 and Y2 = g
rβθ to CSP. (5) CSP chooses a random
exponent ρ2 ∈ Zp and sends X2 = (Y ρ11 Y2)ρ2 to KA. (6) KA
computes Y3 = X
1/θ
2 and sends it to CSP. (7) CSP issues the
D = Y
1/ρ2
3 = g
(α1+α2+βr) part of SK and sends it to DU.
(8) KA issues other parts of SK (L = gr and ∀j ∈ S : Dj =
H(j)
rwj ) and sends them to DU. The complete SK for the
DU is as follows.
SK = {D = gα1+α2+rβ , L = gr,∀j ∈ S : Dj = H(j)rwj}
Since the Wang model is developed based on the Waters
model [4], the general formulas of the setup and key gener-
ation algorithms are similar in both models. This similarity
concludes similar encryption and decryption algorithms.
2) Vulnerability Analysis: At the end of the key generation,
DU receives D = g(α1+α2+βr) from CSP. Now, suppose that
KA colludes with one DU and receives D from it. Since KA
knows α1 and β, as its MK, and its chosen r, KA computes
D′ = g(α1+β·r) to uncover gα2 = D/D′.
Although KA cannot recover α2 from gα2 due to the
hardness of the discrete logarithm problem, it doe not need
α2. Suppose that a new DU requests SK from KA. Then KA
decides r∗ as a GID for the new DU and then issues D =
g(α1+α2+β·r
∗) without any cooperation with CSP through
the secure two-party computation protocol. In addition, KA
can issue the other components of SK for all the attributes.
Although this model is vulnerable to collusion between KA
and DU, there is no chance for CSP to collude with a DU and
uncover MKKA.
D. The Lin Model
Lin et al. [26] developed a collaborative key management
protocol for cloud data sharing.
1) Review of the Lin model: Lin et al. developed a DABE
model with three authorities: Key Authority (KA), Cloud
Server (CS), and Decryption Server (DS). Both KA and CS
issue SKs and DS helps DUs to simplify the decryption
process. The model works as follows.
Setup: A TI chooses two multiplicative cyclic groups G1
and G2 with prime order p and generator g of G1. Then it se-
lects two hash functions H : {0, 1} → G1 and H1 : G2 → Zp,
chooses a group of random elements h1, h2, · · · , hm ∈R G1
that are associated with the m attributes, and outputs public
parameters PP = {g, h1, h2, · · · , hm, H,H1}. KA chooses a
random exponent q ∈R Z∗P as its master key (MKKA = q)
and broadcasts its public key PKKA = gq . Similarly, CS
chooses a random exponent α ∈R Z∗p , saves its master key
(MKCS = gα) and broadcasts its public key PKCS =
e(g, g)α.
Fig. 4. The first sub-protocol in key generation round in the Lin model
Key Generation: The Key Generation protocol consists of
two sub-protocols. In the first sub-protocol, depicted in Fig.
4, (1) A DU requests SK from authorities. (2) KA chooses a
unique τ ∈R Z∗P for DU. Then, CS and KA run a secure two-
party computation protocol which outputs x = (α/q+τ)/q to
CS. (3) CS selects a random exponent σ ∈R Z∗p to calculate
A = gx/σ and send it to KA. (4) KA calculates B = Aq
2
and
sends it to CS. Then CS calculates and saves K ′ = Bσ =
gα+qτ .
Fig. 5. The second sub-protocol in key generation round in the Lin model
In the second sub-protocol, depicted in Fig. 5, (5) CS and
KA choose random exponents r1, pi1 ∈R Z∗p and r2, pi2 ∈R
Z∗p , respectively. Then, they run another secure two-party
computation protocol which outputs CPK3 = (r1+r2)/pi1pi2
to DU, and y = (r1 + r2)pi1pi2 to both CS and KA. (6) CS
chooses ξ ∈R Z∗p and calculates X1 = (K ′)y/ξ and sends it
to KA. (7) KA computes Y1 = X
1/pi22
1 and sends it to CS.
CS computes and saves its secret key CPK2 = Y
ξ/pi21
1 =
(gα+qτ )(r1+r2)/(pi1pi2). (8) KA selects random exponent ς ∈R
Z∗p , calculates X2 = (g
τ )y/ς ,∀x ∈ S : Xx = (hτx)y/ς and
sends it to CS. (9) CS calculates and sends Y2 = X
1/pi21
2 ,∀x ∈
S : Yx = X
1/pi21
x to KA. Finally, KA calculates and saves its
secret key CPK1 = {D = Y ς/pi
2
2
2 ,∀x ∈ S : Dx = Y ς/pi
2
2
x }.
Although the Lin model is developed based on the Water
model, the Lin model changes the formulas of SKs as it divides
SKs among DU, KA, and CS. Afterwards, DO generates the
ciphertext and upload it on CS. Then CS re-encrypts the
ciphertext to realize effective attribute revocation.
To decrypt the ciphertext, both KA and CS send their SKs
(CPK1, CPK2) to DS which generates a simpler ciphertext
and sends it to DU. DU then uses CPK3 to decrypt the
simpler ciphertext.
2) Vulnerability Analysis: Suppose that a DU colludes with
both KA and DS. Then the DU sends CPK3 to KA and
DS sends CPK2, which was received from CS during the
decryption round, to KA . Therefore, KA has three secret
keys, CPK1, CPK2, and CPK3. KA can then calculate
K ′ = CPK1/CPK32 = g
α+qτ . Since, KA has q and τ , it
can uncover gα = K ′/gqτ . Although recovering α from gα
is not practical for KA, having gα is enough to generate SK
for a new DU. KA can choose random exponent τ∗ ∈R Z∗p
and generate new K ′ = gα+qτ
∗
without needing to cooperate
with CS or running the first sub-protocol in Fig. 4. Then KA
decides random exponents r∗1 , r
∗
2 , pi
∗
1 , pi
∗
2 ∈R Z∗p and issues
CPK3 = (r
∗
1 + r
∗
2)/pi
∗
1pi
∗
2 to the new DU, without needing to
cooperate with CS or running the second sub-protocol depicted
in Fig. 5. Then, KA issues related CPK1 and CPK2 to itself,
while CS does not know anything about newly issued SK.
E. Other Models
The Hur model I has been adopted as the base model by
[32], [33], for instance. Although a key revocation capability
was introduced in [32], due to the same key generation round
used as the Hur model I, it suffers from the newly introduced
collusion. Similarly, due to the same key generation round
used in [33] as the Hur model I, it is also vulnerable to the
newly introduced collusion.
We suspect that other models developed based on the Hur
model I/II, the Wang model, and the Lin model might be
vulnerable to the collusion attack among authorities and DUs,
which need further investigation.
V. A SECURED MODEL
In this section, we propose a model to secure the Hur model
I against the newly introduced collusion attack. The secued
model decentralizes ABE with two entities, KGC and AA,
which works as follow.
Setup: To start the system, a TI chooses the public pa-
rameters: a bilinear group G0 with prime order p and gen-
erator g and a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G0, and then
broadcasts its public key PKTI = {G0, g,H}. Afterwards,
KGC chooses two random exponents α1, β ∈R Z∗P , saves its
master key MKKGC = {α1, β}, and broadcasts its public key
PKKGC = {gβ , e(g, g)α1}. Similarly, AA selects a random
exponent α2 ∈ Z∗P , saves its master key MKAA = {α2},
and broadcasts its public key PKAA = {e(g, g)α2}. Since
e(g, g)α = e(g, g)α1 · e(g, g)α2 when α = α1+α2, the public
key of the system is as follows.
PK = {G0, g,H, gβ , e(g, g)α}
Fig. 6. Key Generation Round in the Secured Model
Key Generation: As depicted in Fig. 6, (1) DU requests SK
from AA. (2) AA chooses a specific random exponent r ∈R
Z∗P for the DU. AA then runs a secure two-party computation
protocol to cooperate with KGC which outputs x = 1/β ·
(α1+α2+ r) to KGC. (3) KGC computes D = gx and sends
it to DU. (4) AA issues other components of the SK based
on DU’s attributes: {∀j ∈ S : Dj = gr ·H(j)rj , D′j = grj}.
Therefore, the final SK for DU is the same as the Bethencourt
model.
Analysis: Suppose that a DU colludes with AA and sends
D to AA. Since AA does not know the two elements of β and
α1, it cannot uncover any components of MKKGC . Therefore,
our proposed model is secure against the newly introduced
collusion attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed two types of existing collusion
attacks on DABE schemes, and introduced a new type of
collusion attack among authorities and DUs. We then ana-
lyzed the vulnerability of four DABE models subject to the
newly introduced collusion attack. Based on the analyses, we
proposed a new model to secure one of the vulnerable DABE
models. Secured solutions to other vulnerable DABE models
are left as future work.
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